Jev API webhook signatures
If Stripe, GitHub, or your bus signs deliveries, verify their HMAC. Outbound calls to TypeSafe use a bearer API key, not a webhook signature TypeSafe documents on System One.
This page is for builders who searched an extra “endpoint” name while wiring Jev / System One. jev.pro is an independent unofficial field guide — not affiliated with TypeSafe AI. We do not sell or issue keys. Confirm first-party routes on docs.typesafe.ai/api.
The public API reference documents one evaluation route — POST https://api.typesafe.ai/v1/systemone — plus GET /v1/models. This title is not a separate first-party URL in that reference. Treat the capability as something you implement around the official call.
Steps
- Verify the inbound webhook with the vendor’s signing secret.
- Map the event to filtered
state. - Call
POST /v1/systemonefrom your worker. - Do not wait for a TypeSafe callback they have not documented.
Map onto the official POST
No documented TypeSafe X-Typesafe-Signature on the evaluation API we read. Auth remains Authorization: Bearer. Body remains model, state, questions. Do not put signing secrets in state. Question ids are not sent to the model. Text only.
Official SDKs (typesafe-sdk, @typesafe-ai/sdk) retry 429/529. Other documented statuses: 401, 422. Skipping inbound signature checks because “Jev will judge the payload” is backwards: an attacker who can POST to you can fill state with whatever they want. Schema-safe answers are not proof the event was authentic.
Pin jev-1.13.0 in the worker. jev-latest / jev-preview currently resolve to it — confirm. Vendor-claimed token price still applies to every webhook-driven call. Vendor-claimed 1200 RPM is easy to hit if you evaluate on every noisy event — filter first (64k / 32k context claims also argue for a thin state).
TypeSafe does not POST results to your URL in the public System One reference we used. If you need a queue instead of a webhook, that is your bus.
When not to look for a TypeSafe signature
Outbound System One is a client call, not a webhook TypeSafe sends. Marketplace doors may add their own auth; that is not a first-party HMAC we will invent.
Pitfalls
- Skipping inbound signature checks because “Jev will judge the payload.”
- Putting signing secrets in
state. - Inventing
X-Typesafe-Signatureas official. - Waiting for a TypeSafe callback job.
See also
- API hub — bearer POST
- Webhook channel — your inbound adapter
- Authentication concepts — keys vs signatures
- Async jobs — workers that can restart
FAQ
Does TypeSafe POST results to my URL?
Not in the public System One reference we used.
Is this a documented TypeSafe URL?
No.
Queue instead of webhook?
Can Jev verify Stripe’s HMAC for me?
No. Verify first, then evaluate text.
What this page does not claim
- Official TypeSafe status, logos, or support.
- That jev.pro sells, issues, or proxies API keys.
- Extra first-party HTTP routes beyond
POST /v1/systemoneandGET /v1/modelsunless the API reference lists them. - Invented latency SLOs, search volume, or unofficial prices. List price and rate limits are vendor claims — confirm on models.
- That a schema-constrained answer is automatically factually correct.
Disclaimer
This is an independent unofficial site and is not affiliated with TypeSafe AI; official documentation is available at https://docs.typesafe.ai. Never treat jev.pro as TypeSafe official documentation. We do not sell, issue, or proxy API keys.