Use cases· Last updated

Security failure modes with Jev

SIEM, EDR, and SOAR already detect and can isolate. Jev judges whether the alert narrative + evidence pack is enough and whether policy allows the proposed contain class. Code aborts auto-containment unless those atoms clear. Jev does not match IOCs, isolate hosts, or write detections.

This unofficial page is the failure modes slice of the security containment-abort pack. Intent: apply the Jev (TypeSafe System One) decision model to security containment-abort failure modes. Primary search language: Security Jev failure modes. Confirm patterns on docs.typesafe.ai. This site does not sell, issue, or proxy TypeSafe keys. Use a credential you already have from the console or a documented gateway.

Independent angle (cover ≠ clone): Evidence-sufficiency + policy-allow + abort thresholds before SOAR fires isolate/disable — not a clone of support-action recipes, LLM guardrail Noul screens, or SRE incident SEV classification.

Security use-case context

Security containment-abort breaks in product-specific ways. This page lists those modes so you can write tests — not a generic “AI can be wrong” essay, and not a rival limitations-page clone. Official jaggedness: jev-1.13 does not treat state as hostile by default.

Hub: Use cases. Compare, when the other tool is the real job: security automation.

Failure Modes inputs

Many failures start as contract violations (PCAP dumps, missing enrichment, invented IOC counts). Canonical shape:

{
  "alert": { "id": "SOC-1902", "text": "Impossible travel + new OAuth grant on finance-sso; user says travel is unexpected." },
  "asset": { "tier": "prod-idp", "owner": "identity" },
  "evidence": { "ioc_hits": 0, "enrichment_ok": true, "summary": "No hash match. New grant to unknown app. Last login US-East 40m earlier." },
  "policy": { "isolate": "Auto-isolate only if evidence_ok and asset.tier is not shared-idp.", "evidence_min": "Need either IOC hit or named user contradiction plus enrichment_ok." }
}

Decision signals and actions

HTTP vs application:

You see Class Security move
401 / 422 / 429 / 529 Documented HTTP Fix key/body or back off — errors
200 + flat confidence or Noul ≈ 0.5 Low confidence Abort isolate; analyst queue
Empty gather / enrichment_ok == false Missing evidence abort_enrich — do not call Jev to guess

Do not treat a Noul of 0.5 as a “medium” security containment-abort score — it means yes and no are equally likely. Conjunctions stay in your code.

Guardrails and escalation

Fail closed: do not isolate a host or disable a credential. Schema-safe answers are not factual correctness. TypeSafe’s confidence-gated examples use a lower bar for recoverable reads than for irreversible actions. Those numbers are illustrations. For security containment-abort, treat auto_isolate_host as the high bar (isolating a host or disabling a credential). Tune on labels — see offline evaluation.

Evaluation and rollout notes

Your canary set should include each bullet above.

Pin jev-1.13.0 (the versioned id) after you fit thresholds. jev-latest and the marketing line jev-1.13 can move. Log the response model. TypeSafe’s published list price for jev-1.13 is $0.042 per million input tokens (vendor claim — confirm on the models page); output tokens are free on that same page. Unused distractors still bill as input.

Official Python and JavaScript SDKs read TYPESAFE_API_KEY and retry documented 429/529. This site does not sell, issue, or proxy TypeSafe keys. Use a credential you already have from the console or a documented gateway.

Pack map

Slice Page
Graph and primitives decision workflow
What may enter state input contracts
What to gather first evidence collection
Atomic rules policy checks
Act / review / abstain confidence thresholds
Reviewer payload human handoff
What to persist audit trail
How it breaks you are here
Labeled replay evaluation
Shadow → canary production rollout

FAQ

If the API returns 200, is the decision good? 200 only means the call parsed. Low confidence, Noul ≈ 0.5, or a policy miss are application failures — abort isolate.

Where do official weaknesses live? TypeSafe’s jev-1.13 jaggedness note — distractors, arithmetic, adversarial content. We do not invent more.

Where is the rest of the Security pack? Start with Security evaluation and Security decision workflow. Cluster hub: Use cases.

Is this the LLM guardrails cookbook? No. Guardrails screen prompts and completions. This pack aborts containment when evidence or policy is thin. See LLM guardrails.

If IOC hits are already ≥ 1, should we wait for Jev? No. Deterministic contain wins. Jev is for leftover messy narrative.

What this page does not claim

Disclaimer

This is an independent unofficial site and is not affiliated with TypeSafe AI; official documentation is available at https://docs.typesafe.ai.

Primary documentation: https://docs.typesafe.ai. Hub: Use cases.

Sources

Public TypeSafe or adjacent documentation only. No private claims.