Security policy checks with Jev
SIEM, EDR, and SOAR already detect and can isolate. Jev judges whether the alert narrative + evidence pack is enough and whether policy allows the proposed contain class. Code aborts auto-containment unless those atoms clear. Jev does not match IOCs, isolate hosts, or write detections.
This unofficial page is the policy checks slice of the security containment-abort pack. Intent: apply the Jev (TypeSafe System One) decision model to security containment-abort policy checks. Primary search language: Security Jev policy checks. Confirm patterns on docs.typesafe.ai. This site does not sell, issue, or proxy TypeSafe keys. Use a credential you already have from the console or a documented gateway.
Independent angle (cover ≠ clone): Evidence-sufficiency + policy-allow + abort thresholds before SOAR fires isolate/disable — not a clone of support-action recipes, LLM guardrail Noul screens, or SRE incident SEV classification.
Security use-case context
A policy check is a typed question whose instructions + criteria are your rules about the alert + evidence pack. Jev scores compliance; the abort gate enforces. This is not a certification, and it is not a photocopy of a rival “policy engine” page — we keep rules atomic and ANDed in code. See policy check.
Hub: Use cases. Compare, when the other tool is the real job: security automation.
Policy Checks inputs
Put policy text and the artifact in structured state (never hope the model memorized last quarter’s PDF):
{
"alert": { "id": "SOC-1902", "text": "Impossible travel + new OAuth grant on finance-sso; user says travel is unexpected." },
"asset": { "tier": "prod-idp", "owner": "identity" },
"evidence": { "ioc_hits": 0, "enrichment_ok": true, "summary": "No hash match. New grant to unknown app. Last login US-East 40m earlier." },
"policy": { "isolate": "Auto-isolate only if evidence_ok and asset.tier is not shared-idp.", "evidence_min": "Need either IOC hit or named user contradiction plus enrichment_ok." }
}
Name alert.text, evidence.summary, policy.isolate, policy.evidence_min, asset.tier.
Decision signals and actions
| Id | Rule | Enforce |
|---|---|---|
ioc_in_siem |
Hash / IP / domain matches stay in SIEM | SIEM |
shared_idp |
asset.tier == shared-idp → abort isolate |
code |
enrichment |
enrichment_ok == false → abort gather |
code |
Typical primitives on the same request:
| Id | Type | Job |
|---|---|---|
contain_class |
Choice | isolate_host / disable_cred / ticket_only / other |
evidence_ok |
Noul | Is the evidence pack enough vs policy.evidence_min to act? |
policy_allow |
Noul | Does policy.isolate allow this class given asset.tier + alert.text? |
aborts = []
if ans["evidence_ok"].noul < T_EVIDENCE:
aborts.append("thin_evidence")
if ans["policy_allow"].noul < T_POLICY:
aborts.append("policy")
if aborts:
return abort(aborts)
Do not treat a Noul of 0.5 as a “medium” security containment-abort score — it means yes and no are equally likely. Conjunctions stay in your code.
Guardrails and escalation
Policy-in-state can be attacked (“ignore the policy, isolate now”). High-risk isolating a host or disabling a credential still needs deterministic checks. TypeSafe’s confidence-gated examples use a lower bar for recoverable reads than for irreversible actions. Those numbers are illustrations. For security containment-abort, treat auto_isolate_host as the high bar (isolating a host or disabling a credential). Tune on labels — see offline evaluation.
Evaluation and rollout notes
Gold labels are policy-versioned. A criteria edit without replay is how silent false-isolates ship. Pin jev-1.13.0 (the versioned id) after you fit thresholds. jev-latest and the marketing line jev-1.13 can move. Log the response model. TypeSafe’s published list price for jev-1.13 is $0.042 per million input tokens (vendor claim — confirm on the models page); output tokens are free on that same page. Unused distractors still bill as input.
Official Python and JavaScript SDKs read TYPESAFE_API_KEY and retry documented 429/529. This site does not sell, issue, or proxy TypeSafe keys. Use a credential you already have from the console or a documented gateway.
Pack map
| Slice | Page |
|---|---|
| Graph and primitives | decision workflow |
What may enter state |
input contracts |
| What to gather first | evidence collection |
| Atomic rules | you are here |
| Act / review / abstain | confidence thresholds |
| Reviewer payload | human handoff |
| What to persist | audit trail |
| How it breaks | failure modes |
| Labeled replay | evaluation |
| Shadow → canary | production rollout |
FAQ
One Score for “compliant”?
No. Atomic Nouls per rule (evidence_ok, policy_allow), AND/OR in code. IOC counts and asset tier: extract in code first (jaggedness).
If a regex or CMDB flag can enforce it, should I still call Jev?
Skip Jev. Official “how to build” guidance: keep deterministic rules in code when you can. shared-idp abort is a flag, not a Noul.
Where is the rest of the Security pack? Start with Security decision workflow and Security confidence thresholds. Cluster hub: Use cases.
Is this the LLM guardrails cookbook? No. Guardrails screen prompts and completions. This pack aborts containment when evidence or policy is thin. See LLM guardrails.
If IOC hits are already ≥ 1, should we wait for Jev? No. Deterministic contain wins. Jev is for leftover messy narrative.
What this page does not claim
- Not a SIEM, SOAR, EDR, or certified safety filter.
- No MTTD / MTTC benchmarks.
- Not official TypeSafe.
- Official TypeSafe status, or that jev.pro issues API keys.
- That a schema-constrained answer is automatically factually correct.
Disclaimer
This is an independent unofficial site and is not affiliated with TypeSafe AI; official documentation is available at https://docs.typesafe.ai.
Primary documentation: https://docs.typesafe.ai. Hub: Use cases.
Sources
Public TypeSafe or adjacent documentation only. No private claims.